




























































































































































































































































































































































































Germany	it	is	the	AfD	rather	than	the	NDP	(Nationaldemokratische Partei, National 
Democractic Party)	that	is	winning	the	votes;	in	Greece	it	is	the	Golden	Dawn	(GD, 
Laïkós Sýndesmos – Chrysí Avgí)	rather	than	LAOS	(Laikós Orthódoxos 
Synagermós, Popular Orthodox Rally);	and	in	Austria	it	is	the	FPÖ	rather	than	the	
BZÖ	( Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Alliance for the Future of Austria). 	
	
A	supply-side	perspective:	populism’s	nationalist	vision	of	legitimating	
collective	choice	
	
It	could	be	argued	that	instead	of	simply	responding	to	popular	demand,	parties	
are	themselves	also	shaping	it.	Simply	put,	a	better	way	of	understanding	these	
phenomena	is	by	focusing	on	the	ways	in	which	parties	change	their	rhetoric	and	
programmatic	agendas	to	capitalise	on	demand-side	opportunities	and	entrench	
themselves	in	their	respective	party	systems.	They	do	so,	this	article	argues,	by	
putting	forward	a	(civic)	nationalist	vision	of	democratic	politics.	As	noted	
above,	this	is	not	a	normative	argument.	This	article	does	not	make	a	value	
judgement	about	whether	civic	nationalism	is	a	good	nationalism,	nor	does	it	
suggest	that	by	adopting	this	narrative,	right-wing	populist	parties	are	not	
actually	racist.	Rather,	the	article	puts	forward	an	argument	about	the	ways	in	
which	right-wing	populist	parties	communicate	their	messages,	often	disguising	
exclusionary	agendas	with	value-based	appeals	in	order	to	become	more	
palatable	to	broader	sections	of	the	population.		
	
As	noted	above,	right-wing	populism	feeds	off	conflict	lines,	by	dividing	on	two	
dimensions:	the	‘people	versus	the	elites’	and	the	‘in-group	versus	the	out-
group’.	Simply	put,	the	former	is	the	populist	dimension	and	the	latter	is	the	
nationalist	dimension.	The	vision	of	democracy	they	put	forward	is	one	where	
the	in-group	is	prioritised	in	terms	of	policy	and	provision	of	common	goods.	If,	
therefore,	populism	is	a	way	of	legitimating	collective	choice,	right-wing	
populism	is	a	way	of	legitimating	the	collective	choice	of	the	in-group.	Its	appeal,	
therefore,	premised	on	the	ability	of	draw	on	voters’	multiple	insecurities	and	to	
normalise	exclusion,	can	be	better	understood	through	a	nationalism	framework.	
	
In	other	words,	the	electoral	success	of	right-wing	populist	parties	and	what	
accounts	for	their	ability	to	broaden	their	appeal	beyond	their	secure	voting	
base,	can	be	partly	explained	by	the	type	of	nationalism	they	use	in	their	rhetoric	
																																																																																																																																																														
given	the	crisis	context	that	Spain	has	faced.	There	is	substantial	literature	trying	
to	explain	why	there	has	been	no	far	right	party	in	Spain	and	why	the	country	
has	not	followed	broader	European	trends	(see	e.g.	Alonso	and	Kaltwasser	2015;	
Ellwood	1995;	Halikiopoulou	and	Vasilopoulou	2018).			
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and	programmatic	agendas,	i.e.	the	ways	in	which	they	define	the	in-group	and	
justify	exclusion	of	the	out-group	(see	also	Miller-Idris	(2019)	on	the	use	of	
nationalist	frames).	Specifically	this	article	argues	that	the	increased	relevance	of	
right-wing	populist	parties	is	linked	to	the	manner	in	which	they	employ	civic	
nationalism	in	their	rhetoric	and	programmatic	agendas.	This	is	because	the	
adoption	of	this	type	of	nationalism	allows	parties	with	exclusionary	agendas	to	
appear	legitimate	to	a	broad	section	of	the	population.		
	
At	the	core	of	this	type	of	civic	nationalist	rhetoric	are	right-wing	populist	party	
positions	on	immigration	and	justifications	for	them.	Right-wing	populist	parties	
traditionally	have	ownership	of	the	immigration	issue	(See	e.g.	Ivarsflaten	2008;	
Lucassen	and	Lubbers	2012;	Van	Spagne	2010).	They	maintain	that	those	who	
are	not	members	of	the	in-group	should	be	excluded	from	the	national	polity	and	
be	denied	access	to	the	collective	goods	of	the	state.	The	question	then	inevitably	
becomes,	who	is	a	member	of	the	polity?	And	most	importantly,	what	are	the	
criteria	used	to	determine	this?	The	questions	of	whether	someone	is	a	member	
of	the	polity,	and	when	one	becomes	a	member,	are	outside	the	scope	of	this	
article.	Rather,	what	is	of	concern	here	is	which	groups	right-wing	populist	
parties	define	as	outsiders	and	why.	Often,	right-wing	populist	parties	include	
native-born	residents	or	citizens	in	their	categorisation	of	‘immigrant	groups’	
(Asari	et	al.	2008).	The	civic	nationalist	narrative	is	important	in	explaining	the	
ways	in	which	they	justify	this:	increasingly	less	in	terms	of	descent,	as	they	seek	
to	distance	themselves	from	race-based	framing	grounded	in	origins,	and	more	
in	terms	of	value-based	arguments	that	emphasise	democratic	principles,	
presenting	as	outsiders	those	who	not	adhere	to	them.		
	
This	argument	draws	on	the	work	of	Halikiopoulou	et	al.	(2013),	which	has	
argued	this	point	both	theoretically	and	empirically,	focusing	on	European	far	
right	parties.	This	work	has	shown	that,	in	Europe,	the	far	right	parties	that	enjoy	
relative	success	in	mainstream	electoral	politics,	such	as	the	Swiss	People’s	Party	
(Schweizerische Volkspartei,	SVP),	the	United	Kingdom	Independence	Party	
(UKIP)	and	the	FN	(now	Rassemblement	National),	tend	to	be	the	ones	best	able	
to	distance	themselves	from	primordial	and	ascriptive	elements	of	national	
identity	such	as	race,	creed,	blood	and	kinship,	and	instead	adopt	civic	values	
including	democracy,	citizenship	and	respect	for	the	rule	of	law.	This	argument	
fits	within	a	broader	supply-side	literature	that	focuses	on	far	right	
normalization	strategies	(e.g.	Golder	2003;	Mayer	2015),	arguing	that	the	most	
successful	far	right	parties	in	Europe	are	those	that	have	abandoned	connections	
with	fascism,	favouring	instead	a	new	ideological	basis.	It	is	important	to	note	
here	that	this	discursive	choice	is	neither	static	nor	linear:	parties	may	again	
change	the	way	in	which	they	use	nationalism	in	their	rhetoric	and	
programmatic	agendas	depending	on	changes	in	demand,	party	system	dynamics	
and	new	political	opportunities.	UKIP	is	an	example	of	a	party	shifting	from	a	
predominantly	civic	type	of	nationalism	to	a	more	ethnic	one	after	the	Brexit	
referendum	for	reasons	mainly	specific	to	the	British	context.	Despite	such	
individual	cases,	the	broader	European	trend	is	towards	the	adoption	of	
normalization	strategies	that	employ	predominantly	civic	nationalist	narratives.		
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The	‘civic	nationalist	normalization’	strategy	(Halikiopoulou	and	Vlandas	2019)	
is	underpinned	by	the	portrayal	of	cultural	issues	as	value-driven	and	
ideological,	as	opposed	to	biological.	While	nationalism	--	understood	as	the	
attainment	and	maintenance	of	the	autonomy,	unity	and	identity	of	the	nation	
(Breuilly	2005)	--	is	key	to	the	programmatic	agendas	of	all	right-wing	populist	
parties,	it	is	usually	assumed	in	the	literature	that	far	right	parties	are	nativist	
(Mudde	2007),	adopting	ethnic	nationalist	agendas	(Hainsworth	2008).	The	
latter,	refers	to	the	type	of	nationalism	that	justifies	exclusion	on	ascriptive	
criteria	of	belonging,	such	as	blood,	creed	and	common	descent.	Right-wing	
populist	parties,	however,	are	increasingly	adopting	civic	nationalist	narratives,	
focusing	instead	on	adherence	to	political	values	and	institutions	as	the	key	
criteria	of	defining	the	in-group	and	out-group.	Such	narratives	justify	exclusion	
on	the	basis	of	a	purported	inability,	or	refusal,	of	certain	population	groups	to	
adhere	to	‘our’	liberal	democratic	values	because	their	values	are	inherently	
antithetical	(Halikiopoulou	et	al.	2013).	In	other	words,	they	invoke	a	form	of	a	
‘clash	of	civilizations’	thesis,	framing	identity	in	"civilisationist"	terms	(Brubaker	
2017a;	Betz	and	Habersack	2019),	which	also	explains	their	staunch	anti-Islamic	
discourse.		
	
In	sum,	the	key	to	this	supply-side	perspective	is	nationalism.	In	this	sense,	it		
has	greater	explanatory	value	than	populism,	which	is	insufficient	in	itself	in	
explaining	the	rise	of	right-wing	variants,	as	it	is	more	generic	and	may	be	used,	
as	mentioned	above,	to	describe	a	broad	range	of	liberal	democracy’s	
challengers.	While	both	populism	and	nationalism	emphasize	conflict	lines,	focus	
on	the	collective,	and	put	forward	a	vision	of	an	ideal	society,	they	are	indeed	
conceptually	different	(Bonikowski	et	al.	2019).	It	is	the	chameleon-like	
character	of	nationalism	(Hall	2011;	Zimmer	2003)	and	its	flexible	quality	as	a	
thin	ideology	(Freeden	1998)	that	allows	right-wing	populists	to	tailor	their	
narratives	accordingly.		
	
The	article	proceeds	to	sketch	briefly	the	civic	nationalist	narratives	of	two	
European	right-wing	populist	parties:	the	German	AfD	and	the	French	FN.	While	
these	parties	differ	in	many	ways	relating	to	their	origins	and	historical	
development,	what	they	share	is	a	common	anti-Islamic	narrative,	which	
exemplifies	the	ways	in	which	they	use	a	civic	nationalist	discourse	to	frame	
their	message.	The	overarching	commonality	is	an	emphasis	not	on	Muslims	per	
se,	but	rather	on	Islamism	as	an	ideology	--	a	value	system,	which	they	identify	as	
antithetical	to	that	of	liberal	democracy.	This	also	helps	them	resolve	tensions	
between	defining	the	out-group	through	a	race-base	framing	--	for	example	
many	perpetrators	of	terrorist	attacks	in	France	were	actually	native-born	
second	or	third	generation	French	citizens	--	and	distancing	themselves	from	
explicitly	racist	arguments.	They	do	so	through	the	adoption	of	an	ideological	
rather	than	biological	justification	of	exclusion,	which	presents	Islam	as	a	breach	
of	the	Western	liberal	democratic	consensus.	These	people	are	defined	as	foreign	
not	because	of	their	ethnic	descent,	but	for	voluntaristic	reasons:	because	they	
do	not	adhere	to	Western	liberal	democratic	values.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	here	that	measuring	the	uptake	and	resonance	of	this	
message	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	article.	This	article	does	not	make	
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deterministic	claims	about	supply,	nor	does	it	suggest	that	demand	is	irrelevant	
to	the	understanding	of	right-wing	populist	party	support.	The	aim	of	the	next	
few	lines	is	to	focus	on	two	examples	that	illustrate	the	ways	in	which	supply	
also	matters	in	our	understanding	of	this	phenomenon.	Future	research	could	
focus	more	on	the	interplay	between	demand-	and	supply-side	dynamics,	testing	
how	and	to	what	extent	the	civic	nationalist	message	resonates	among	different	
social	groups	with	different	backgrounds	and	preferences.		
	
Europe’s	civic	right-wing	populists	
	
The	AfD	
	
The	election	of	the	AfD	in	the	German	Bundestag	in	2017	in	many	ways	marked	
the	end	of	German	exceptionalism	with	regard	to	right-wing	populism.	While	
other	parties	on	the	far	right	end	of	the	political	spectrum,	such	as	the	NDP,	
competed	in	elections	previously,	they	have	tended	to	remain	marginalized	in	
the	German	political	system.	Why?	This	case	is	a	good	example	of	the	limitations	
of	demand-	side	explanations.	For	example,	while	the	cultural	backlash	thesis	
stresses	the	importance	of	anti-Islamic	sentiments	as	drivers	of	support,	in	fact	
in	2017	the	AfD	performed	particularly	well	in	the	east	of	Germany	which	has	a	
very	small	Muslim	population	compared	to	the	west	(Betz	and	Habersack	2019).	
Thus	anti-Islamic	sentiments	alone	cannot	explain	the	AfD’s	disproportionate	
success	in	the	east.	Nor	can	economic	anxiety:	individual	level	analyses	of	AfD	
support	suggest	that	the	party’s	voters	do	not	fit	the	typical	blue	collar/	
economically	deprived	far	right	voter	profile	(Betz	and	Habersack	2019).	The	
limits	of	demand	point	to	the	importance	of	supply-side	dynamics.			
	
The	AfD	fits	within	the	right-wing	populist	party	category	(Betz	and	Habersack	
2019).	The	party	claims	to	speak	in	the	name	of	the	people,	and	equates	these	
people	with	a	culturally	defined	in-group.	It	attributes	blame	to	immigrants,	and	
particularly	Muslims,	for	a	range	of	social	problems	thus	appealing	to	voters'	
multiple	insecurities.	What	is	distinct	about	the	AfD	in	comparison	to	other	
German	parties	on	the	far	right	of	the	political	spectrum	is	the	way	that	it	does	
this,	through	the	use	of	a	particular	type	of	nationalist	narrative	that	it	employs	
in	its	programmatic	agenda.	Refraining	from	overt	references	to	racism	
(Arzheimer	2015),	the	party	centres	its	nationalism	in	cultural	threats	posed	by	
those	whose	values	are	antithetical	to	‘ours’.		
	
This	is	evident	in	the	ways	in	which	the	party	communicated	its	message	during	
the	2017	election	campaign.	In	sum,	this	was	centred	on	portraying	Islam	as	a	
threat	to	German	values.	A	series	of	AfD	posters	chose	images	symbolising	the	
Western,	and	sometimes	specifically	German	way	of	life,	such	as	traditional	
dress,	food,	drink,	and	beachwear,	juxtaposing	them	to	what	the	party	identifies	
as	symbols	of	Islam	such	as	the	burka	and	the	prohibition	of	certain	foods	and	
drink	such	as	pork	and	alcohol	(AfD	2017).	The	idea	was	to	build	on	a	series	of	
fabricated	divisions	at	the	core	of	which	is	culture:	freedom	vs.	restriction;	
progressive	values	vs.	reactionary	ones;	and	tolerance	vs.	intolerance.			The	civic	
nationalist	message	of	this	narrative	is	clear:	by	seeking	to	limit	freedom,	Islamic	
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values	not	only	erode	the	traditional	German	way	of	life,	but	are	actually	
antithetical	to	the	very	essence	of	the	liberal	democratic	vision	of	this	society.		
	
The	FN	
	
Unlike	the	AfD,	the	FN	is	a	party	with	a	much	longer	history.	As	such,	it	offers	
researchers	a	good	platform	for	making	cross-time	comparisons.	The	party’s	
performance	across	time	has	been	characterised	by	ebbs	and	tides,	revealing	a	
cyclical	pattern	(Halikiopoulou	2018).	Nonetheless,	its	electoral	performance	
was	particularly	strong	during	the	2017	French	presidential	elections.	The	party	
has	progressed	to	the	second	round	of	the	French	presidential	elections	twice:	in	
2002	and	in	2017.	The	33.9	per	cent	it	received	in	the	second	round	of	the	latter	
is	its	highest	percentage.	This	increase	in	the	party’s	electoral	support	has	also	
coincided	with	its	ability	to	broaden	its	electoral	base	in	recent	years,	gaining	
votes	from	across	the	political	spectrum,	including	from	groups	less	likely	to	vote	
for	the	far	right,	such	as	women	(Mayer	2013).		
	
The	breadth	of	the	FN’s	electoral	appeal	has	coincided	with	the	party’s	
programmatic	shift	from	predominantly	ethnic	to	predominantly	civic	
nationalism.	This	shift	has	been	most	evident	in	the	transition	of	the	party’s	
leadership	from	Jean-Marie	Le	Pen	to	Marine	Le	Pen.	During	Jean-Marie	Le	Pen’s	
leadership,	the	préférence	nationale	--	the	party’s	key	nationalist	proposition	that	
in	France	the	French	must	come	first	--	was	pursued	through	an	"indirect	racist	
discourse"	(Hainsworth	2008).	The	pursuit	of	a	de-demonization	strategy	by	
Marine	Le	Pen	(Ivaldi	2015)	has	entailed	a	shift	to	priorité	nationale,	in	an	
attempt	to	normalise	the	party,	distance	it	from	fascism	and	right-wing	
extremism,	and	thus	extend	its	electoral	appeal	(Alduy	and	Wahnich	2015).	
Similarly	to	the	discourse	of	the	AfD,	the	FN	also	focuses	on	Islam	in	its	attempt	
to	place	the	immigration	issue	within	a	framework	of	a	broader	value	conflict.		
	
The	party’s	position	on	terrorism	illustrates	this	point	well.		Terrorism	is	an	
issue	that	has	become	increasingly	salient	across	Europe	in	recent	years,	and	
particularly	in	France,	which	has	experienced	a	series	of	attacks	on	its	soil.	The	
FN	has	been	particularly	active	in	its	attempt	to	capitalise	on	voters'	concerns	
with	regards	to	terrorism,	by	linking	the	issue	with	immigration	on	its	
programmatic	agenda.	It	has	done	so	by	employing	a	civic	nationalist	narrative	
that	places	terrorism	within	a	broader	framework	of	a	value	conflict,	linking	it	to	
immigration	and	national	security.	For	example,	in	the	aftermath	of	certain	
attacks,	the	party	repeatedly	labelled	terrorists	as	the	"enemies	of	liberty"	and	
described	the	"Islamist	danger"	as	a	"consequence	of	massive	immigration"	
(Front	National	2015).	Through	this	type	of	rhetoric,	the	FN	avoids	racialized,	
descent-based	exclusionary	rhetoric,	instead	portraying	terrorism	as	a	breach	of	
the	French	liberal	democratic	consensus	(Hutchins	and	Halikiopoulou	2019).		
	
Conclusion	
	
This	article	has	suggested	that	in	order	to	understand	the	electoral	success	of	
right-wing	populist	parties	across	Europe,	we	need	to	extend	our	analyses	
beyond	demand-side	explanations,	and	also	take	into	account	the	importance	of	
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supply.	More	specifically,	the	article	has	argued	that	instead	of	just	responding	to	
popular	demand,	parties	are	themselves	shaping	it.	They	are	doing	so	through	by	
using	a	narrative	that	merges	populism	and	civic	nationalism.	The	most	
electorally	successful	far-right	parties	in	Europe	are	those	that	are	able	to	merge	
their	populist	narrative	--	that	is,	their	claim	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	people	and	
restore	national	sovereignty	--	with	a	nationalist	narrative,	that	is,	an	attempt	to	
define	this	people	as	an	in-group	that	solely	deserves	access	to	the	collective	
goods	of	the	state.	If,	in	other	words,	as	per	Riker	(1982),	populism	is	a	way	of	
legitimating	collective	choice,	right-wing	populism	is	a	way	of	legitimating	this	
choice	by	putting	forward	a	nationalist	vision	of	(pseudo)	democratic	politics.	
For	the	most	successful	right-wing	populist	parties,	this	nationalist	vision	is	a	
civic	one:	it	defines	the	out-group	in	ideological	rather	than	biological	terms,	
making	exclusion	more	easily	justifiable.		
	
To	illustrate	the	point	empirically,	the	article	has	focused	on	two	parties:	the	
German	AfD	and	the	French	FN.	In	the	case	of	the	former,	the	idea	is	to	show	how	
a	right-wing	populist	party	may	be	successful	within	the	German	context;	in	the	
case	of	the	latter	to	illustrate	how	the	party	has	both	broadened	and	increased	
its	electoral	appeal	after	it	changed	its	supply.	In	both	cases,	the	common	
underlying	theme	is	the	adoption	of	a	civic	form	of	nationalism,	which	has	
allowed	the	parties	to	attract	votes	from	across	the	political	spectrum.		
	
Why	is	this	important?	In	short,	the	contribution	of	this	article	is	twofold.	First,	
the	civic	nationalism	theoretical	perspective	sheds	light	on	how	other	parties	
respond.	While	extreme	right	or	far	right	parties	tended	to	be	ostracised	and	
isolated	in	the	past,	right-wing	populist	parties	have	been	able	to	permeate	the	
mainstream.	The	ability	to	present	immigration	as	a	value	problem	and	thus	to	
distance	themselves	from	racism	and	right-wing	extremism,	makes	these	parties	
more	acceptable	to	a	broader	range	of	voter	groups.	The	problem	is	not	only	the	
electoral	gains	these	parties	are	making,	but	also	the	increasing	consensus	that	
mainstream	parties	should	respond	by	imitating	them,	i.e.	adopting	similar	
policy	positions	on	certain	issues,	for	example	immigration.	The	adoption	of	the	
populism	label	further	normalises	what	is	essentially	a	far	right	discourse.	In	
short,	civic	nationalism	does	not	shield	from	extremism;	it	makes	societies	more	
vulnerable	to	extremism	by	disguising	it.		
	
Second,	this	perspective	highlights	a	range	of	potential	policy	solutions	that	
extend	beyond	the	‘cultural	backlash’	conventional	wisdom.	Simply	put,	the	
demand-side	distinction	between	culture	and	economy	is	in	many	ways	a	false	
dichotomy.	Both	are	part	of	the	solidarity	pact	between	states	and	citizens,	that	
is,	the	social	contract	(Halikiopoulou	and	Vasilopoulou	2018).	As	such,	both	are	
equally	important	to	voters.	Populist	right-wing	parties	are	increasing	their	
electoral	fortunes	because,	by	proposing	(civic)	nationalist	solutions	to	a	variety	
of	socio-economic	problems,	they	are	appealing	to	a	broad	range	of	voters	with	
different	insecurities.	To	compete	with	these	parties,	other	parties	must	address	
these	underlying	insecurities,	which	go	well	beyond	immigration.	It	entails	a	
focus	on	the	losers	of	the	social	contract	and	the	policies	that	compensate	them.			
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